<p>World War II bombers had a circular error probable (<hi format=bold>CEP</hi>)—the radius within which half of their bombs would fall—of 3,300 ft (1,005 m). In practical terms, this meant that 9,000 bombs were required to achieve a 90 per cent likelihood of destroying a 60 × 100 ft (18 × 30 m) building. By Vietnam, only 300 bombs were required. Then came laser-guided bombs.
</p>
<display id=\weapons\photos\gbpave01.bmp>
<p>Laser guided bombs (<hi format=bold>LGB</hi>s) were arguably the most revolutionary improvement in bombing accuracy in the history of military aviation. These weapons were eventually redesignated under the larger GBU class, which also included the other class of 'smart', unpowered weapons, electro-optical guided bombs. A computer simulation by Texas Instruments in the early 1970s asserted that a group of 100 targets which would require 21,000 manually aimed bombs or 4,000 continuously computed impact point (CCIP) aimed bombs would only require 100 LGBs. Although actual performance was not quite as impressive (no weapon has ever achieved 100 per cent success), actual results from the 1991 Gulf War proved LGBs to be unsurpassed for destroying point targets. Although the LGBs are more expensive than unguided bombs, in the more important comparison of 'cost per target killed' they are far cheaper, both in terms of ordnance expended and crew/aircraft exposure to enemy defenses.
</p>
<hi style=hdr1>Operational US Paveway II Laser-Guided Bombs</hi>
<row><c>GBU-12D/B<c>MAU-169B, C, D, E & F/B<c><c><c><c>
<row><c>GBU-16/B<c>MAU-169/B<c><c><c><c>
<row><c>GBU-16A/B<c>MAU-169A/B<c>Mk 83<c>1,110 lb<c>MXU-667/B<c>USN only
<row><c>GBU-16B/B<c>MAU-169D, E, & F/B<c><c><c><c>
</table>
<hi style=hdr1>Paveway II Laser-Guided Bombs</hi>
<p>Of all the Paveway I LGBs used in Vietnam, only those based on the Mk 80 series bombs were retained and improved by the performance enhancement program (<hi format=bold>PEP</hi>). <hi format=bold>Paveway II</hi> bombs were externally distinguishable from Paveway Is by their 'pop-out' wings which made handling and carriage easier. Their MAU-169 computer control groups (<hi format=bold>CCG</hi>) differed from the Paveway I's MAU-157 in its ability to guide on coded laser illumination, thus making it possible to attack multiple targets simultaneously while reducing the probability of successful countermeasures. To incorporate this feature, pulse repetition frequency (<hi format=bold>PRF</hi>) selectors were mounted on the exterior of the CCG. Both Paveway I and II bombs used 'bang-bang' CCGs that utilized full control deflection to alter a bomb's trajectory, thus shortening its normal ballistic range. For this reason, Paveway I and II bombs were dropped ballistically, with the laser only being turned on during the last few seconds of flight to refine the impact point. Paveway II GBU-10s cost $22,000 and GBU-12s $9,000 each.
</p>
<p>All operational Paveway II weapons had 1-in (2.5-cm) wide ID stripes on the left side of their wings (4 in/10 cm long), canards, and CCG (both 3 in/7.6 cm long).These stripes were yellow for GBU-10s and orange for GBU-12s.
</p>
<hi style=hdr1>Paveway III Laser-Guided Bombs</hi>
<p><hi format=bold>Paveway III</hi> low-level laser-guided bombs (<hi format=bold>LLLGB</hi>s) use proportional guidance CCGs to increase both bomb range and accuracy. LLLGB kits were developed for both the 500-lb <hi format=bold>GBU-22/B</hi> and 2,000-lb GBU-24 bombs but, at a price of $65,000 each, only the latter generated a performance increase warranting production. The <hi format=bold>GBU-24/B</hi> uses a Mk 84 warhead while the <hi format=bold>GBU-24A/B</hi> uses the BLU-109/B penetration warhead. The latter warhead requires the ADU-548 adapter kit with saw-tooth adapters to smooth air flow over the tail section and a hardback to compensate for the reduced diameter of the BLU-109 warhead. The <hi format=bold>GBU-27/B</hi> Paveway III bomb is modified to fit within the F-117A weapons bay. It has shorter canards and Paveway II wings and an adapter collar between the CCG and the warhead shortened from the GBU-24's 9 in (23 cm) to only 6 in (15 cm).
</p>
<p>The <hi format=bold>GBU-28/B</hi> '<hi format=bold>Deep Throat</hi>' bomb was developed during the 1991 Gulf War to implement attacks against several deeply buried bunker complexes in the Baghdad area containing the main Iraqi command and control facilities. With 20-ft (6-m) reinforced concrete ceilings buried 100 ft (30 m) in the ground, these bunkers were impervious to ordinary conventional bombs. Initial discussions about how to attack this class of target were held in the weeks leading up to the 15 January UN deadline, with the weapon referred to as the hard target penetrating munition (<hi format=bold>HTPM</hi>). The final Lockheed-proposed design called for an 8-in (20-cm) howitzer barrel machined to a shape resembling an elongated BLU-109 and fitted the GBU-27's airfoil group, but with the GBU-24's longer adapter collar. The final go-ahead to develop the bomb was not granted until 11 February 1991, three weeks into the air war. Initially, four bombs were constructed, with two used for testing and the others reserved for combat use. The barrels were taken out of storage at Watervilet Arsenal in New York, cut and machined to size, fitted with an artillery shell nose and shipped to Eglin AFB where they were loaded with explosives. Because of their length, each bomb nose was lowered into a pit and filled with explosive filler by means of a bucket brigade (after giving the safety officer some Valium).
</p>
<p>Meanwhile, an evaluation was carried out to determine which would be the better delivery vehicle, the F-111F or F-15E. The bomb proved too long for carriage on the F-15E's centerline station, both because of take-off and landing clearance and loading requirements. (The GBU-28's suspension lugs are 10 in/25 cm farther forward when used on the F-15E when compared with the F-111F.) Also, the bomb's requirement for four arming lanyards to be pulled would have required a computer delivery from the F-15E, which in turn would have required non-existent ballistics and a risky computer change. The F-111F could drop the bomb with manual ballistics, but faced a minor problem in that it could only lower its flaps to 30 degrees (instead of the normal 34 degrees) for take-off while carrying the bomb. Of greater concern was the F-111F's longer moment arm (the distance from the aircraft centerline at which the bomb was carried). The bomb was first flown on an F-15E on Wednesday 20 February (configured with LANTIRN pods, a clean centerline station, the GBU-28 on left the wing, a Mk 84 LDGP on right wing—until after take-off when it was jettisoned—and shoulder-mounted AIM-9L/Ms), while weather delayed the F-111F flight until next day. No operationally significant restrictions were found with either airframe as a result of these flights.
</p>
<p>Dropping the GBU-28 required delivery at high subsonic speeds from above 25,000 ft (7,620 m) to achieve the desired kinetic energy and impact angle. In addition to the airframe constraints already discussed, the F-15E's LANTIRN pods, designed for use at low altitude, were not pressurized and would arc if used at high altitude. Also, a second aircraft was required to lase the target from altitudes compatible with LANTIRN. (Later in 1991, a technique was developed at Eglin to permit F-15E delivery of the GBU-28 using the computer program in use by aircraft still in Saudi Arabia. It required use of Mk 84 ballistics to establish azimuth aiming, then switching to Mk 20 ballistics to establish ranging.)
</p>
<p>On Friday afternoon, a reluctant decision was made to proceed with the F-111F, and a test drop was conducted at the Nellis AFB, Nevada range complex on Saturday. The test dropped was deemed successful, with the bomb burying itself so deep in the ground that it was never recovered. The final test before use was a sled run at Holloman AFB, New Mexico to evaluate bomb fuzing—the weapon cleanly punched through a 20-ft (6-m) reinforced concrete wall and continued another 0.5 mile (0.8 km) before coming to earth. By the time this happened, the two combat bombs were en route to Taif, Saudi Arabia on a C-141, still warm to the touch from the freshly poured molten explosive filler. The bombs were airborne again only four hours after arriving, this time on a one-way trip to Baghdad, arriving just four hours before the end of the war.
</p>
<p>Initially only 30 GBU-28s were procured for use by F-111Fs and F-15Es. In FY94, an additional 100 'GBU-28 follow-on' bombs were ordered for delivery in FY95 at a unit cost of about $170,000. These differed from the original weapons in that their software enables them to be delivered from lower altitudes.
</p>
<p>All operational Paveway III weapons had 1-in (2.5-cm) wide ID stripes on the left side of their wings (3.5 in/8.9 cm long), canards and CCG (both 3 in/7.6 cm long).These stripes were gray for GBU-24s and green for both the GBU-27 and 28.
</p>
<p>The successor to Deep Throat is the <hi format=bold>Boosted Penetrator</hi>. This is projected to be a 2,250 to 3,000-lb bomb fitted with a rocket motor to drive it deep underground. Designed for internal carriage by B-2As and F-117As, the 116-in (295-cm) long bomb could also be carried externally by other aircraft, including the F-16 and F/A-18.
</p>
<hi style=hdr1>US Paveway III Laser-Guided Bombs</hi>
<p>The <hi format=bold>AN/AAS-35 Pave Penny</hi> target identification set, laser (<hi format=bold>TISL</hi>), is used by the OA-10A and A-10A, and limited numbers of F-16s. It is a direct descendent of Vietnam-era Pave Arrow (F-100) and Pave Sword (F-4) programs. Not a designator, this laser detector is carried on its own pylon from the forward right fuselage of the A-10. It is used to sense laser energy from ground- or air-based designators reflecting off targets, displaying a cueing symbol on the HUD to assist the pilot in locating the target. Although this information could be used for the delivery of laser-guided ordnance, in practice the targets would normally be attacked with 'dumb' bombs or (in the case of the A-10) gunfire.
</p>
<hi style=hdr1>Pave Tack</hi>
<p>The <hi format=bold>AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack</hi> pod features all the modes first developed for the Vietnam-era Pave Knife pod. However, unlike earlier laser designators, Pave Tack is totally integrated with the host aircraft's avionics system, allowing it to be cued to where the radar is looking. This capability, in concert with the replacement with an imaging infra-red sensor of the TV sensors used by earlier designators, enables Pave Tack-equipped aircraft to autonomously deliver LGBs at night from extremely low altitudes. Earlier systems had relied heavily on 'buddy' lasing, with one aircraft lasing the target for others, usually from medium altitudes.
</p>
<p>It was originally planned to equip 180 F-4Es and 60 RF-4Cs with Pave Tack. However, because of a protracted and difficult development program, the actual number was substantially lower. A practical drawback to using the 1,385-lb pod with the F-4E was its large size, which required carriage on the centerline station, displacing the 600-US gal 2270-liter) external fuel tank. In the end, Phantom crews referred to the pod as 'Pave Drag'. About 150 pods were built, and all eventually ended up being used by F-111Fs (and later Australian F-111Cs). The F-111F community used Pave Tack to great effect during the 1991 Gulf War, using it to deliver the majority of LGBs employed by the USAF against Iraq.
</p>
<p>Unlike on the F-4E, the F-111C/F Pave Tack installation mounts the pod on a rotating cradle in the weapon bay. The outer weapon bay doors have a 'cut out' section towards the rear, while the inner ones are replaced by the cradle. Although normally installed, the cradle can be removed and replaced by weapon bay doors in about an hour. Looking forward, the cradle rotates clockwise to stow the pod and counter clockwise to expose it. The pod is painted FSN 34087 olive drab with predominately black markings. The FLIR window has a milky amber color, while the two smaller laser windows are basically clear, but have a distinct bluish tint.
</p>
<hi style=hdr1>Paveway Fuze Options</hi>
<table>
<tblhdr><c>Fuze<c>Location<c>Type<c>Remarks
<row><c>FMU-81<c>nose or tail<c>short delay<c>Paveway II & III
<row><c>FMU-124<c>nose or tail<c>inst.<c>Paveway II
<row><c>FMU-139<c>nose or tail<c>inst. or short delay<c>Paveway II & III
<row><c>FMU-143<c>tail<c>inst. or short delay<c>penetration warheads
</table>
<hi style=hdr1>LANTIRN</hi>
<p>Low-Altitude, Navigation and Targeting, Infra-Red, for Night (LANTIRN) emerged from the 'black' world in late 1979. Named by then commander of Tactical Air Command, General Wilbur Creech, it was perceived by the Carter administration as a low-cost alternative to the recently proposed F-15 Strike Eagle, allowing F-16s and A-10s to attack Warsaw Pact armored formations at night. As originally conceived, LANTIRN was to cost $500,000, be contained in a single pod and employ a laser radar (LADAR) terrain-following system. Its targeting FLIR, when coupled with automatic target recognition, promised to make possible the remarkable performance of automatically launching six Mavericks at separate tanks within 20 seconds, while distinguishing friend from foe in the process.
</p>
<p>Then reality set in. By the time it was fielded, LANTIRN was no longer low cost and had become an integral part of the F-15E's avionics. Since lasers can not see through clouds, the first thing to go was the LADAR, being replaced with a single terrain-following radar (TFR), very similar to what had been used for years by the F-111. Very early on, it was recognized that there were high and low risk portions to the program and action was taken to separate these. The TFR was combined with the wide field of view Navigation FLIR (NavFLIR) to form one pod, while the much more challenging technologies were merged into a second, Targeting FLIR (TgtFLIR) pod.
</p>
<p>The AN/AAQ-13 NavFLIR pod had a reasonably straightforward gestation. To facilitate low-level flight at night, it overlays cues from the TFR on the FLIR image displayed full scale on the aircraft's wide field of view (WFOV) HUD. The pilot has the ability to 'snap-look' roughly one FOV left, right, up, or down, with the control switch spring-loaded to the 'straight ahead' position. The total area available for the pilot to look at with the FLIR defines its 'field of regard' (FOR). Although the TFR generates automatic terrain-following commands, integration of these with the older flight control system of the F-15E proved exceeding difficult, forcing 'Beagle' pilots to focus on the task of manually flying low level at night like their lives depend on it, which they quite literally do. Without auto-TFR, the F-15Es are limited to 'under the weather' terrain following, unlike soon-to-be-discarded F-111s which have routinely flown 'in weather' TFR since the mid-1960s. The F-16's fly-by-wire flight control system was able to integrate auto TFR quite easily, but the extra drag created by the LANTIRN pods exacerbate its already anemic low-altitude range performance.
</p>
<p>The AN/AAQ-14 TgtFLIR pod eventually had to settle for less lofty goals than had been initially set for it. Its target recognition objectives drove a requirement for enough picture elements, or 'pixels' to define with great certainty not only that it was looking at a tank, but whose tank, and at a range that would allow a Maverick to be locked onto and launched at it. The number of pixels that could be packed into a given space were limited by the size of the pod, and the two requirements drove the field of view available. The TgtFLIR's very narrow field of view (NFOV) was also expected to automatically boresight the six Maverick missiles carried on two LAU-88 triple rail launchers. To overcome a relatively slow gimble rate by the Maverick seekers, and operating on the presumption that all the targets would be located in relatively close proximity to one another, the pod would not only direct the first missile's seeker to its target, but also the second's, so it would be looking close to where it needed to be when its turn came to locate a target. However, it was soon discovered that just the slop between the missile and its rail could result in the missile's seeker being outside the FOV of the TgtFLIR. Add to that the considerable amount of flexing done by the F-16 wing, and the whole idea began to unravel. Eventually, the pod was accepted without the auto-recognition feature, which continued in development, although the requirement to blunt hordes of Red armor faded away with the Cold War. By the time of the Gulf War, TgtFLIRs had just started to become operational, and had a performance roughly comparable to the older Pave Tack system used operationally by F-111Fs for 10 years in a package about one-fourth as heavy.
<p>The <hi format=bold>GBU-15</hi> modular guided-weapon system (<hi format=bold>MGWS</hi>) bomb family was initially called <hi format=bold>EOGB-II</hi>. Originally there were to be many versions, using both the Mk 84 bomb and SUU-54 dispenser. Two types of wings were designed: a cruciform wing (<hi format=bold>CW</hi>) for short-range bombs and a planar wing (<hi format=bold>PW</hi>) for long range. The former were known as modular guided glide bombs (<hi format=bold>MGGB</hi>, and later<hi format=bold> MGGB-I</hi>), and the latter as<hi format=bold> MGGB-II </hi>or the extended range version (<hi format=bold>MGGB-ERV</hi>). The GBU-15 CW weapon was first proposed for use during the 1973 war, but at that time only two bombs' datalink pods were being tested. More bombs would not have been available until early 1974, so the idea quickly died (although Israel became a major GBU-15 customer). The MGWS test program initially suffered from abysmal reliability problems, with the planar wing version eventually being canceled.
</p>
<p>Production weapons are basically Maverick missile seekers mated to Mk 84 warheads and fitted with large wings. In practice, they are usually launched from beyond the range of enemy defenses and guided by datalink, often from a second aircraft well away from the combat zone, allowing the launching aircraft to concentrate on its egress from the target area. While they are normally guided manually all the way to impact, GBU-15s can also be locked on at any point during flight, called lock-on after launch (<hi format=bold>LOAL</hi>). Datalink control is exercised through the <hi format=bold>AXQ-14</hi> pod, originally called electronic datalink pod (<hi format=bold>MGGB EDLP</hi>). After Desert Storm, the AXQ-14 was gradually replaced by the newer (but externally identical) <hi format=bold>ZSW-1</hi> pod.
</p>
<p>As many as two of TAC's 4th TFW squadrons were operational with GBU-15 and Pave Tack. Initial plans to equip USAFE F-4Es at Spangdahlem AB, Germany with GBU-15 were abandoned in favor of Lakenheath F-111Fs. The only PACAF F-4E unit to employ the GBU-15 was the 3rd TFS at Clark AB, Philippines. With their deactivation in 1991, this workload-intensive weapon was employed only by USAFE's 493rd TFS F-111Fs. They launched 70 GBU-15s against well-defended, high-value targets during Desert Storm. Both clear electro-optical (<hi format=bold>EO</hi>) and amber-colored imaging infra-red (<hi format=bold>IIR</hi>) seeker heads were used (the former costing about $195,000, and the latter about $300,000 each). All Mk 84 versions of the GBU-15 were expended during Desert Storm, with slightly more of the IIR seekers and 'short chord' wings being used. The original 'long-chord' and the newer 'short-chord' wings both have the same glide performance. GBU-15s utilize the FMU-124 instantaneous or short-delay impact fuze.
</p>
<p>The <hi format=bold>GBU-15I</hi> was introduced after Desert Storm. It is only configured with the BLU-109 warhead and short-chord wings, using the ADK-723 adapter kit to compensate for its narrower diameter when compared with Mk 84-based versions. Both the GBU-15 and GBU-15I became operational with F-15Es during 1993.
</p>
<p>Trainer designations include the GBU-15(V)1, 2, 31, and 32(T-1)/B. These are captive devices normally used in conjunction with datalink pods, with one aircraft representing the launching aircraft and the other the bomb. The WSO in the 'launching' aircraft directs the 'bomb' using datalink commands which are actually flown by the pilot of the 'bomb' aircraft.
</p>
<p>When the F-111F employs the GBU-15, the datalink pod is mounted on the aft fuselage station where the ALQ-131 ECM pod is normally located. Since it is not required, the Pave Tack is removed and the shallow (two-band) ALQ-131 is mounted on its cradle. When flown on the F-15E, the bombs are carried on the wing pylons with the datalink pod on the centerline.
<p>This is a Northrop/Hughes-developed proposal to provide the B-2A with a stop-gap PGM capability until JDAM becomes operational in 1999. The GPS-aided targeting system (<hi format=bold>GATS</hi>) portion of the program is managed by the B-2 program office and uses the aircraft's synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and GPS positioning information to accurately determine target location. This involves making an initial target identification using the aircraft's SAR, then flying a low-observable arc towards the target to create a relative bearing change of at least 25 degree from the initial SAR image. A second image will then be generated and used to automatically refine aim points and eliminate GPS-bias (the differential between a target's real location and its GPS location, which can be as much as 30 ft/2.8 m). Initially, GATS will be loaded with preplanned aim points which the aircrew will be able to refine in flight. When Block 30 aircraft become available in early-1997, they will be capable of inflight retargeting. The first set of Block 30 stores management software began flight tests in a KC-135 in November 1994.
</p>
<p>In 1994, Congress appropriated $25 million to procure 128 GPS-Aided Munitions (<hi format=bold>GAM</hi>s). This 2,000-lb class, Mk 84-based weapon has a tail-mounted guidance section containing a combined inertial measuring unit (IMU) and GPS receiver, a guidance and control unit (GCU), and an airfoil group. GAM has an eight to 10-mile (13 to 16-km) long footprint when launched from an altitude of 40,000 ft (12,192 m). The 128 GAMs will allow eight B-2As to be equipped with 16 RLA-mounted weapons, each capable of being directed against a separate target.
</p>
<p>The first six of 28 demonstration versions of GAM were delivered by late 1994 for ground and flight testing. The first drop test was conducted on 23 November 1994 from an F-4 at China Lake, California. It was released from 37,500 ft (11,430 m), traveled 32,000 ft (9,754 m) downrange, and achieved a 90 degree impact angle 44 ft (13 m) from its intended target. Two more drops from an F-4 occurred in December 1994. The first was from 16,000 ft (4,877 m) downrange, achieving a 110 degree impact angle. The other flew 25,000 ft (7,620 m) downrange and 10,000 ft (3,048 m) cross range.
</p>
<p>Three more GAM drop tests from a B-2 are scheduled in 1995, prior to the beginning tests of the entire GATS/GAM system in August. Initial operational capability is expected in July 1996. Expected accuracy is 45-60 ft (14-18 m) for Block 10 aircraft, and 20 ft (6 m) for Block 20.
</p>
<hi style=hdr1>JDAM</hi>
<p>Joint direct attack munition (<hi format=bold>JDAM</hi>) is an Air Force-led amalgamation of programs to increase the accuracy and lethality of conventional bombs. Before it became known as <hi format=bold>JDAM</hi> in early 1994, the program had been known as JDAM-Phase 1 (<hi format=bold>JDAM-1</hi>) and inertially aided munition (<hi format=bold>IAM</hi>). The goal is to permit the accurate delivery of conventional bombs against multiple targets per pass, overcoming the limitations weather placed on the delivery of PGMs. The weapon will use a steerable tail unit coupled to a relatively inexpensive GPS-aided inertial guidance system to hit within 43 ft (13 m) of preprogrammed targets in any weather. It is hoped that advanced GPS techniques can lower this figure to as little as 25 ft (7.6 m).
</p>
<p>A draft request for proposals (RFP) was released in October 1992, followed by a formal RFP in January 1993. Tests using GBU-15(V)-1 airframes with seeker heads replaced by INS/GPS guidance packages were conducted in early 1993 from a Block 40 F-16C (88-0441). In six test launches under varying conditions, impact distances ranged from 6.6 to 36 ft (2 to 11 m) from the target.
</p>
<p>JDAM engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contracts were awarded in April 1994 to Martin Marietta and McDonnell Douglas ($13.8 and $35.0 million, respectively). Eliminated from the program were Hughes, Lockheed, Rockwell/Boeing, Texas Instruments, and Raytheon. Initially planned only for 2,000-lb class Mk 84 and BLU-109 bombs, in 1994 a need was recognized for a 1,000-lb Mk 83-based JDAM variant for the F-22, and the Navy expressed interest in ensuring it is compatible with its aircraft. The 2,000-lb weapon is designated <hi format=bold>GBU-29</hi>, while the 1,000-lb weapon will be known as the <hi format=bold>GBU-30</hi>.
</p>
<p>Selection of the winning EMD competitor is scheduled for October 1995, with the placement of an initial production order of 500 kits. Initial JDAM flight testing will begin in October 1996 with the F-16.
</p>
<p>The Navy priority for GBU-29 capability is the F/A-18C/D in 1999, followed by the F/A-18E/F and F-14 in 2000, and eventually the AV-8B, P-3, and S-3.
</p>
<p>The first Air Force aircraft to become operational with the GBU-29 will be the B-2A in 1997. It will be followed by the B-52 in 2000, B-1B in 2001, and F-16C/D in 2002. Plans for the F-15E are uncertain at this point. Testing of the GBU-30 with the F-22 will begin in 2001 following initial testing with the F-16.
</p>
<p>The USAF plans to buy 59,000 GBU-29s and 3,000 GBU-30s, while the Navy plans to buy 12,000 GBU-30s. Ultimately, enough kits may be bought to equip 30-50 per cent US Mk 82 and Mk 84 inventories, along with another 35,000-50,000 kits for allies. Unit price in 1991 was expected to be as much as $53,000. However, in large part because of JDAM's status as a acquisition pilot program, by 1995 goal each guidance kit is expected to cost about $40,000 initially, with the cost eventually falling to less than $25,000. At those prices, total acquisition figures could rise to 100,000 to 150,000, with the goal being to eventually eliminate 'dumb bombs'.
</p>
<p>The name advanced all-up round (<hi format=bold>AAUR</hi>) was adopted in 1994 for a program previously known as joint programmable fuze (<hi format=bold>JPF</hi>) and JDAM-Phase 2 (<hi format=bold>JDAM-2</hi>). Its goal is to develop a 500-lb bomb with improved accuracy over the previous Mk 82.
</p>
<p>Also renamed in 1994 was the JDAM performance improvement program (<hi format=bold>JDAM PIP</hi>), which had previously been known as JDAM-Phase 3 (<hi format=bold>JDAM-3</hi>), and the adverse weather precision-guided munition (<hi format=bold>AWPGM</hi>). With the goal of reducing miss distance for the 14-nm (26-km) ranged weapon against preprogrammed targets to under 10 ft (3 m) in any weather, it focuses on three areas: reducing target location errors, increasing GPS accuracy, and adding a seeker to the nose of the weapon. Beginning in October 1993, several terminal guidance seeker concepts were evaluated, with particular attention being paid to seeker performance in battlefield smoke and haze. Candidates that survived this evaluation were synthetic-aperture and millimeter-wave radars, as well as terrain comparison. In addition, imaging infra-red was selected for use on the AGM-154C JSOW, but no decision will be made until FY98 about which seeker to fit to JDAM.
